

you have tax increases on automatic pilot of \$1 billion a day. That is the hemorrhage we have to stop. That is the real problem confronting us. And we are not doing it. We are arguing whether it is for the middle class or rich, and who is going to get the political credit. We ought to stop these shenanigans and get down to the business at hand.

I thank the Chair.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

POTENTIAL DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN TROOPS TO BOSNIA

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, this week the Senate and the House began conducting hearings on the potential deployment of American ground forces to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event a peace agreement is reached. This is the beginning of a very important process of congressional review and debate. I am pleased that the administration sent the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to testify on behalf of the administration's proposal.

Any decision to send American Forces into harms' way requires the utmost consideration. American interests may justify sending Americans into Bosnia, but the goals must be clear and the risks must be understood and weighed carefully.

Unfortunately, the administration has not yet made the case for its proposed operation. Many questions remain unanswered and many answers remain ambiguous.

The first task must be to persuade the Congress that this is the best option of the options available. And let me be clear, there are other options.

For over 3 years now, I have called for American leadership. For over 3 years now, I have called for NATO involvement. But, I am not convinced that exercising United States leadership and deploying NATO ground forces in support of a peace agreement that partitions Bosnia is the best or only option. We need to know: will American Forces be the guarantors of ethnic cleansing? Will they be used to prevent Moslem refugees from returning to their homes in what becomes the Bosnian Serb Republic?

With respect to the peace settlement, the administration must be able to ensure that any peace reached is a stable and sustainable peace—that there are defensible borders; that the Bosnian Government structure is viable; that this is not just the first step toward a greater Serbia.

If there is a genuine peace, there is a real question why tens of thousands of

peacekeepers, including Americans, are needed? Moreover, how did the administration come up with the number 25,000 for the American ground force contribution? Is this solely the result of President Clinton's speech 2 years ago or is there a military rationale for it?

There is a lot of confusion as to what NATO's role will be. Will NATO ensure the territorial integrity of Bosnia? Who will accomplish the tasks that NATO does not wish to be involved in, such as facilitating the return of refugees, the conduct of free and fair elections, humanitarian operations?

What will this operation cost? What factors are current cost estimates based on? How does the administration plan to pay for such an operation? Was Secretary Perry serious when he said that the administration would take funds from missile defense programs—intended to protect Americans from the growing threat of missile defenses—for peacekeeping?

What are the criteria for success of this operation? What is the exit strategy? How do we ensure that the Bosnians can defend themselves once peacekeepers leave? Who will arm and or train the Bosnians?

It seems to me that developments in recent months have vindicated the overwhelming majority in Congress who argued that the Bosnians and the Croats were capable of defending themselves if armed. It has also demonstrated that NATO air power can be used effectively and that Bosnian Serb Forces are not invincible. The military balance began shifting in Bosnia, but I am not sure that it has stabilized. In my view, lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia is as relevant in a post-settlement situation as it is now. This matter cannot be avoided and must be resolved as part of any peace settlement.

The bottom line is that Congress is not yet in possession of the facts. Indeed, the administration is not in possession of the facts. There is no settlement yet. But, with that in mind, we must make sure that we do not deploy any forces without clear answers to these critical questions. I am deeply concerned that since current NATO plans call for initial deployments within a few days of a settlement being signed that we may not have all the answers—and that the administration will go ahead and deploy forces and try to figure out what they will be doing after they are already on the ground.

In view of these many unanswered questions—and those I have raised are by no means all-inclusive—I would strongly urge the administration to cooperate with the Congress and provide us with the information we need to make an informed judgment.

Furthermore, I strongly urge the administration to seek congressional authorization for any deployment of United States ground forces to Bosnia. This was my view prior to the gulf war, and it is now. It is essential that the American people are behind any under-

taking that places thousands of our soldiers in a dangerous environment for a prolonged period of time.

Mr. President, let me also express my deep concern about other aspects of the diplomatic process and the talks that are due to begin on August 31 in Dayton, OH. The agenda does not include Kosova which has been under martial law for over 6 years now. This is not just a matter of human rights, but a question of Kosova's status. Even in the former Yugoslavia, Kosova had autonomous status—the people and their assembly could make their own decisions. Today, there are 2 million Albanians there under an apartheid-like system—A large majority terrorized and oppressed by a small minority.

We cannot let Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic off the hook for Kosova, or for his continued support of paramilitary forces which are reported today to have slaughtered hundreds of Moslem men and boys in northern Bosnia. Milosevic is no peacemaker, rather the mastermind behind ethnic cleansing, oppression, and aggression in the former Yugoslavia. As early as 1992, senior U.S. Government officials accused him of war crimes. But today, he has been invited by this administration to the United States to participate in peace talks. I believe that this was a serious error in judgment which calls into question the administration's commitment to the prosecution of war criminals in the former Yugoslavia. Sure, Milosevic has not yet been indicted by the war crimes tribunal, but, there is no doubt that he has given support and safe haven to some of the most notorious war criminals. Slobodan Milosevic should not be issued a visa. If the administration insists on this, at the very least, it should ensure that any visa issued to Milosevic confines him to Wright Patterson Air Force Base. He does not deserve to be treated like other foreign dignitaries.

Finally, there should be no comprehensive sanctions relief on Serbia until there is a satisfactory resolution of the situation in Kosova. Unless there is a comprehensive settlement including Kosova, there will be no stability in the region—one of the key objectives presently being cited by the administration. The sanctions on Serbia are the only leverage the United States and the international community have been willing to use on the Belgrade regime.

Mr. President, I hope that the administration will address my concerns and those of my colleagues, and cooperate with the Congress so that together we can determine what is in the best interest of the United States.

EXTENSION OF TIME FOR MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that morning business be extended.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

AUTHORIZING TROOPS IN BOSNIA

Mr. FEINGOLD. I, too, am about to speak about the situation in Bosnia and am glad to follow on the remarks of the majority leader and the Senator from West Virginia, both of whom have expressed a concern about the role of Congress as we go forward with this possible commitment of troops into the situation in Bosnia.

This week, administration officials testified before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House International Relations Committee, and the House National Security Committee on the issue of the deployment of United States troops as a part of NATO's implementing force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While the testimony laid out some of the proposals the administration is contemplating, it opened up many, many questions for consideration, some of which the majority leader just listed. The most constructive forum, in my view, to debate those issues, though, is through the constitutional process embodied by the War Powers Act by which Congress is required to authorize the deployment of troops into imminent hostilities. For that reason, I am pleased that just today the President has indicated that he will seek congressional approval of the mission, as Senator BYRD just reported. I am not completely satisfied, however, that the President will request authorization prior to the time that he has actually made a commitment. I want to be sure that he does not sign a peace treaty with that commitment in it and then come back and say, "By the way, I need your approval to go forward."

If Congress is going to really be a partner in the process envisioned under the Constitution then we should either vote on an authorization prior to the commitment to deploy is made, or alternatively, the President should clearly state that any commitment he makes for U.S. troop deployment during negotiations is contingent upon congressional approval. One way or the other, the President has in effect rendered Congress' role meaningless.

To ensure that this most necessary exchange takes place in the most constructive sequence, Mr. President, I am going to introduce a sense-of-the-Senate resolution today which would express our intention to vote on a resolution of approval prior to the commitment to introduce United States forces in Bosnia as a part of IFOR. My resolution does not approve or disapprove of the administration's proposal. Rather, it requires the Senate to debate and vote on it before we are presented with a commitment to deploy. What I am trying to avoid, Mr. President, is being presented with a fait accompli to authorize a deployment, and therefore

undermine the important debate that we should have had.

Mr. President, in many respects this is a bit of a rehash of the war powers debate, the debate about whether this body has the right and the responsibility to authorize the use of American troops. Indeed, the mere fact that this resolution is needed indicates the institutional crisis we face in this country about how we make the gravest of decisions—the decision about whether to send American men and women in harm's way overseas.

This is a debate we face every time American troops are called to active duty. Unfortunately, it is not a question we have seriously sought to resolve. Instead, we seem to muddle through each crisis and try to work out sort of a case-by-case understanding between the Congress and the President, somehow hoping that the skeleton of war powers will stay hidden in the closet just until the current crisis goes away, as if there is not going to be another crisis in the future.

Mr. President, the issue of war powers will not go away because its purpose really makes too much sense to ignore. While the War Powers Act has certainly failed as a mechanism for implementing article I of the Constitution, its intention should be heeded, and Bosnia is a perfect example of why.

The Constitution and the War Powers Act were both crafted to take advantage of the collective wisdom and power of both the President and the Congress in making some of the most serious decisions we face. Our democracy does not vest in one person so much power that he or she alone can use military force to accomplish their own goals. Rather, our system splits such an awesome power by charging the President with commanding the Army, the Navy, and giving Congress both the power to declare war and the responsibility to appropriate funds for military action.

Mr. President, Congress is not simply supposed to be consulted on such matters or just be a rubberstamp for such actions. Congress is supposed to be an active partner in this process.

Mr. President, I think this is shared power worth protecting. While I have no doubt of President Clinton's motives in committing 20,000 troops to Bosnia, I want to ensure that some other future President does not have the unilateral authority to send 80,000 troops for some reason that she or he alone supports. We have to remember that how we proceed here can and will set a precedence on how troops are deployed for other peacekeeping or peace-enforcing missions.

Mr. President, this process is also important for marshaling public support for any military operation—which, as any of our veterans will tell you, is a critical element for success for any mission. It is through the authorization process that the mission is explained and refined to the American people generally, and specifically for

those folks that are asked to serve their country and risk their lives. The questions are answered, fears are alleviated, and the American people are given an opportunity to air their views on what the mission means and is worth to them.

In this case, in this case of Bosnia, there are many, many, unanswered questions at this point, many good questions that the President will want to answer in building support for this mission.

Mr. President, these are very, very crucial questions. They are fair questions. Their answers hold great consequences for this country, for NATO, for the Balkans, and perhaps for the world.

Certainly, if we are going to do something as drastic as deploy U.S. troops, we have to create a process by which the Congress and the executive work together to forge a workable and attainable mission.

Mr. President, my main point is that consultations are not going to be enough. Authorization that comes just after a commitment to the parties has already been made is not sufficient, either. Congress has to have this debate before the President is authorized to commit troops, and any commitment he makes prior to congressional approval, I believe, has to be explicitly conditioned upon subsequent congressional consent.

This is the only way to ensure that article I of the Constitution is respected and that the awesome decision of placing U.S. troops into imminent hostility is one that is jointly made by the executive and the legislative branches. Our troops must have the confidence that, if they are going to be sent to Bosnia, they are doing it with the support of the American public through their elected Representatives. If they cannot get that, then perhaps we may actually say that their mission may not be worth the risk.

Mr. President, I yield the floor and suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CRAIG). The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

NATIONAL ENDOWMENTS

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I find it both ironic and disheartening to be standing here 30 years after the establishment of the National Foundation on the Arts and the Humanities—30 years distinguished by success in preserving and nurturing the arts and scholarship of our Nation—defending the very principles upon which the legislation was created. As one of the founding sponsors of the legislation authorizing the National Endowments, I am deeply concerned about the future of these extraordinary agencies.